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I. JUDIClAL PRECEDENTS FOR ADOPTING A RULE OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The majority opinion in the Illinois Supreme Court held that if a
change was to be made, the task was for the legislature, not the court.
The five in the majority were not ready to deliver an opinion like that
in MacPherson, Henningsen, Greenman.' If they had, there is real
reason to believe that a similar consequence of an immediate and
substantial judicial following would have developed. Without saying
so, they seemed to be influenced by the thought that they would be
complete pioneers in uncharted territory, with no precedents to rely
upon or to interpret.
Are there any judicial precedents? Yes-quite a number-all rele-
vant, but in varying degrees and in differing respects.
Some courts have adopted a form of comparative negligence. The
leading example is Tennessee with its judicially created doctrine of
remote contributory negligence, which is actually a form of com-
parative negligence, though the Tennessee Supreme Court has fre-
quently denied it.2 The essential difference between the Tennessee
rule and ordinary comparative negligence is that in the latter, damages
are mitigated or diminished in accordance with the relative degrees of
negligence of the parties, while in the former, they are diminished in
accordance with the relative closeness of the causal connection. The
Tennessee doctrine, which developed gradually through court deci-
sions, is now firmly established.3 There is still some confusion, how-
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1. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenman v. Yuba
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). All are in the
field of products liability.
2. See especially, East Tennessee V. & G. By. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 3, 12 S.W. 419
(1889).
3. See, e.g., McCullough v. Johnson Freight Lines, Inc., 202 Tenn. 596, 308 S.W.2d
387 (1957); McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 505 (1950); Williams v.
Black, 147 Tenn. 331, 247 S.W. 95 (1923) (remittitur granted); Bejach v. Colby, 141
Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919); Louisville, N. & Great S. R.R. v. Fleming, 82 Tenn.
128 (1885). See Comment, Remote Contributory Negligence: A Tennessee Concept,
22 TENN. L. REV. 1030 (1953). In Memphis St. Ry. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn. 712, 81
S.W. 374 (1904), the court seemed to be holding that in every case involving alleged
contributory negligence the issue must be submitted to the jury vith an instruction on
remote contributory negligence. Cf. Sharp v. J. C. Penny Co., 361 F.2d 722 (6th Cir.
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ever, as to the precise meaning of "remote contributory negligence"4
and disagreement as to the exact instructions which should be given
to the jury. Even more striking from the standpoint of judicial action
is the fact that the Tennessee court took an ordinary railroad precau-
tions statute5 and, with no language on which to base the decision,
held in an action against the railroad that contributory negligence
on the part of the automobile driver would not bar recovery but
would merely mitigate damages.6 Someday-perhaps soon-the Ten-
nessee courts will review the total history and forthrightly admit that
they have been applying comparative negligence all along.
Georgia's comparative negligence rule is usually attributed to a
statute, but a historical study indicates that the statute grew out of
language in the opinions of previous decisions of the Georgia Supreme
Court.7 Also, in Hawaii there have been judicial statements indicating
the present or impending existence of comparative negligence there.8
1966) (must be submitted to jury unless court finds contributory negligence is proximate
cause as a matter of law).
4. A series of court of appeals cases has defined the "remote cause" as "that which
may have happened and yet no injury have occurred, notwithstanding that no injury
could have occurred if it had not happened." De Rossett v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App.
451, 475, 239 S.W.2d 366, 377 (W.S. 1950); Elmore v. Thompson, 14 Tenn. App.
78, 100 (M.S. 1931). Try saying that right fast to recite a real legal conundrum. It
can be analyzed if one goes about it carefully, but the exact meaning is still elusive.
Several writers have understandably reached the conclusion that the Tennessee doc-
trine is a form of last clear chance. See, e.g., W. PRossER, SELECTED Topics iN =r-f
LAW OF ToitTs 50-51 (1954). This is erroneous. Last clear chance continues to exist
as an independent doctrine in Tennessee and plaintiff's damages are not diminished.
See, e.g., Todd v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry., 135 Tenn. 92, 185 S.W. 62 (1916);
Harbor v. Wallace, 31 Tenn. App. 1, 211 S.W.2d 172 (1946); Smith v. Beattie, 346
F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1965); Wade, Torts-Annual Survey of Tennessee Law, 6 VAND.
L. REv. 990, 1003-05 (1953); Comment, Torts-Last Clear Chance Doctrine, 20 TENN.
L. REv. 288 (1948).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-1208 and 65-1209 (1955).
6. The initial case was Louisville & N. Ry. v. Burke, 46 Tenn. 45 (1868). For other
representative cases, see Poe v. Atlantic Coast Line !1.R., 205 Tenn. 276, 326 S.W.2d
461 (1959); Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Page, 153 Tenn. 84, 282 S.W. 376 (1925);
Nashville & C.R.R. v. Nowlin, 69 Tenn. 523 (1878); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Farmer,
220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955). An amendment in 1959 changed this by providing that
"the issue of contributory negligence shall be tried and be applied in the same manner
.. . as in the trial of other negligence actions under the common law of Tennessee."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1209 (Supp. 1968).
7. See Macon & W. Ry. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250, 254 (Super. Ct. 1858); Macon &
W. Ry. v. Davis, 27 Ca. 113, 119 (1859); Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ca. 358, 361-62
(1859). See also Hilkey, Comparative Negligence in Georgia, 8 GA. B.J. 51 (1945);
Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 304, 326-33
(1950). The statutes were enacted in the 1860's. See GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1958);
id. § 105-603 (1956).
8. See Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 85-86 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304
F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Hawaii 128, 363 P.2d 969
(1961) (contribution between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault); see also Loui




The Illinois and Kansas experience with slight and gross negligence
did not concern true comparative negligence involving mitigation of
damages, but it is significant in that it was both initiated and abolished
by judicial action without legislative interventionY Thus, the courts
were creating without legislative assistance the contributory negli-
gence rules.
Finally, the various recognized exceptions-such as that of inten-
tional, wilful and wanton, or gross misconduct, and especially that
of last clear chance-were all judicially created. Did the Lord speak to
the prophets, the judges, in the days of Butterfield's violent ride from
the public house and of "Davies' dying donkey,"10 and have such
utterings "long since ceased"? Are courts fully authorized to create
and establish exceptions to an established doctrine but not to modify
it in other ways?
There have been several judicial alterations of the legal principle
which is behind and explains the doctrine of contributory negligence.
The true basis of contributory negligence has been the subject of
much discussion. Courts have talked about the principle that they
should not render assistance to a wrongdoer, about rules of causation,
and about what rule would discourage negligent conduct; and some
legal writers have talked about what rule gives the court control
over the jury's conduct.
The principal explanation of the defense of contributory negligence,
I think, is something else; it grows out of the nature of the common
law and its adversary system. The object of common law pleading
was to reduce the dispute between the parties to certain specific
issues, and the court then decided for one party or the other. One
party won, and the other party lost on each issue. It was black and
white-all or nothing. The common law decided issues; it did not
compromise them. Compromise was not only anathema, it was not
even considered. Thus, if the issue was whether a negligent plaintiff
could recover from a negligent defendant, the answer was either yes
or no. The plaintiff either recovered all his damages or he recovered
nothing. It never even occurred to the court in Butterfield, Davies or
the other early contributory negligence cases to allow recovery of a
proportionate part of the plaintiff's damages. If such a thought had
9. Illinois cases are discussed by the appellate court in Maki v. Frelk, 85 Il. App.
2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284, 286-88. See generally Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39
ILL. L. REV. 36, 47-54 (1944); Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,
41 ILL. L. REv. 151 (1946); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cn.-
KENT L. REv. 304, 305-13, 317-18 (1950).
10. The references, of course, are to Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng.
Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), and Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588
(Ex. 1842).
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occurred, the courts would have dismissed it as unworthy of the
common law, and suitable only for the untutored lay mind, or
perhaps occasionally in equity. This being true, it is no wonder that,
as between all or nothing, a negligent plaintiff should normally receive
nothing." Given the precise statement of the issue, one cannot
quarrel with the result.
There are numerous illustrations of this principle in the common
law. For example, take contribution and indemnity between tort-
feasors. Indemnity was always permitted in suitable cases. The
issue was whether the plaintiff received everything or nothing, and the
court felt competent to decide it. In contribution, the plaintiff was
seeking only a part of his loss, and the court was not ready even to
consider his suit. Take the case of a wrongdoer who obtains a chat-
tel by theft or fraud from one party and sells it to another. If the
original owner sued the purchaser, he recovered either the full value
of the chattel or nothing. Take the case of an offer for a unilateral
contract which is withdrawn before full performance. The con-
tract was either good or bad, and the offeree recovered all or nothing.
In recent years there has been some change from this all-or-nothing
dichotomy, and the change has sometimes come about by action of
the courts themselves. Several illustrations occur in the field of resti-
tution, where it is the law which creates the obligation. Perhaps most
significant is the case of contribution between joint tortfeasors. A
substantial number of courts have, on their own, adopted the rule
that contribution will be permitted, 2 and if to them is added the
states which have enacted statutes, this is now the majority rule.
The analogy should be apparent.
In the case of intervening impossibility in performance of a con-
tract, there have been indications that the amount of recovery might
be apportioned;' 3 so also with a contract rendered void or unen-
11. Even in the earlier trial cases of Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685, 170 Eng. Rep.
496 (N.P. 1799), and Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44, 170 Eng. Rep. 743 (N.P. 1803),
where the problem of the effect of contributory negligence seems to have been left to
the jury and it found for the plaintiff, the only question was whether the plaintiff
received all or nothing.
12. See, e.g., Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247
Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963);
Duluth, M. & N. By. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931).
13. See, e.g., Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd.,
[19433 A.C. 32, 144 A.L.R. 1298 (1942), resulting in passage of the Law Reform
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 GEO. 6, c. 40; Note, Quasi-Contract-
Impossibility of Performance, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 401, 421 (1948); Note, Apportioning




forceable by mistake, 14 with two victims of a defrauder,"5 with the
parties to an illegal contract,16 and with other situations. 7
A modem supreme court in these days does not-or at least should
not-treat as beneath its dignity the laying down of a rule which
reaches a compromise settlement between two parties so long as the
result is just. The court now knows that there may be answers other
than yes and no; it has imbibed and administered equitable prin-
ciples; and it should no longer find it necessary to leave to the lay
jury or the lay legislature the utilization of an obvious means to attain
justice between the parties.
The problem with which we are concerned is one which is typically
handled by the court rather than the legislature; it is a tort problem.
While legislatures are notoriously slow to enact tort legislation, 8 the
courts, on the other hand, have been most ready to make changes in
judge-made tort law.19 In the field of tort law, there is no detrimental
reliance on the rule, as in commercial and property law.20
14. See, e.g., National Presto Indus. v. United States, 388 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965), noted in 65 CoLum. L. REv. 542 (1965), and 53
GEo. L.J. 826 (1965).
15. See Devlin, L. J., in Ingram v. Little, [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, 73-74 (C.A.); Seavey,
Embezzlement by Agent of Two Principles: Contribution? 64 HAnv. L. REv. 431, 435
(1951); Grunfield, A Study in the Relationship between Common Law and Equity in
Contractual Mistake, 15 MOD. L. REv. 297, 318 (1952).
16. See Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95
U. PA. L. REv. 261, 304 (1947).
17. "For there is nothing sacred, there is nothing immanent, there is not even great
utility, in this whole-hog-or-none approach which is so typical of law. . . . Surely we
have in this white-black division an ancient echo, the ghost-voice of premedieval
centuries, of a procedure too crude to be far trusted. Only one step back of it would
be the time when even law and fact were undistinguished, when a man swore merely,
or the court decided, on his 'right.' And in our later, more refined developments the
officials often enough have followed better insight. An 'equitable' lien, created by
court or by the Betterment Acts, comes in between fiat ouster of the owner and fiat
forfeiture of improvements made in all good faith. The jury, in the teeth of the
instructions, will whittle down the verdict of the plaintiff who has been at fault.
Ratable sharing is the aim of bankruptcy; return of a going business to the now
insolvent is, at least theoretically, the goal of a receivership. There is some trend, then,
toward a more intelligent adjustment, toward the discovery of the more workable result,
of the result that gives some hope of less bad blood." K. LLEWELLYN, ThE BRAMBLE
BusH 143 (1960).
18. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law,
48 Musm. L. Piny. 265 (1963); Pedrick, Torts: On Civilizing the Law of Torts, 6
J. Soc. Pu. TEcs. L. 2, 8 (1961).
19. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part I1 Judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA.
L. REv. 115 (1962); Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance
of Appellate Courts, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1254 (1966) (numerous judge-made tort changes
listed); cf. Cowan, Rule or Standard in Tort Law, 13 RuTGEBs L. REv. 141, 156-61
(1958).
20. There would seem to be little effect on liability insurance. See Morris, Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554
(1961); Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mici.
L. REv. 689 (1960).
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The problem is not too complex to be handled by a judicial deci-
sion. The state statutes on the subject are short and are written in
rather vague language, leaving many difficult problems to be worked
out by the courts.2' Court decisions could not only go as far as the
statutes, but could attempt to work out the problems as well.2
Finally, the two most significant decisions of the United States
Supreme Court since World War II, Brown v. Board of Education
and Baker v. Carr,24 are direct precedents here. The point? In each
the Court had waited long and patiently for the legislatures to take
suitable action in the appropriate fields, but it finally gave up the
wait as hopeless and decided to act itself. This principle, clearly estab-
lished by the joint holdings, may turn out in the end to be as impor-
tant as the express holdings themselves. Its importance is not con-
fined to constitutional law. If the state legislatures are unable or
unwilling to act in the contributory negligence area, the courts, in the
interest of attaining justice in a practical fashion, must give considera-
tion to the reform of a judge-made law.
II. PLA NTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE AND THE JURY
It is often said that the existence of the jury is the principal reason
why the contributory negligence rule was created and should be
continued. On the one hand, it is suggested that the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence is necessary as a means for the court to maintain
control of the action of the jury.25 On the other, it is urged that there
is no need to change the contributory negligence rule because the
juries habitually disregard the instructions and by applying their own
sense of justice as derived from community standards, they actually
have been applying comparative negligence all along.2 The con-
21. Such problems as: the effect of plaintiff's contributory negligence in an action
for strict liability or breach of warranty; whether the doctrine of last clear chance and
assumption of risk will continue to have independent significance; the application of the
traditional concepts of causation and lack of duty; the in-pari-delicto principle; whether
there should be proportionate set-offs when both parties suffer damages; and many
others. See, for example, the judicial treatment of these problems under one statute in
Note, Torts-Effect of Mississippi's Comparative Statute on Other Rules of Law, 39
Miss. L.J. 494 (1968). See generally, Traynor;- The Courts: Interweavers in the
Reformation of the Law, 32 SAsK. L. REv. 201 (1967).
22. For a suggested opinion simply adopting the comparative negligence rule, see
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HIv. L. REv. 463, 508 (1962);
see also W. Seavey, CoGrrA-noNs ON TonTs 55-57 (1954); Peck, note 18 supra at
304-07; Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken to the Call of Progress, 43
A.B.A.J. 127 (1957).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. See, e.g., Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American
Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1957); and see the treatment of this in Malone, note 9 supra.
26. For judicial expressions-to this effect, see Hqlt, J., in Haeg v. Sprague, Warner &
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tradiction between these two positions is easily apparent, although it
is not quite as real as it appears. The first argument is really con-
fined to the use of a directed verdict for the defendant; the second
applies to the case which is turned over to the jury, at which time
control is apparently lost.
The second argument, as a basis for keeping the present systems,
seems to me to be both hypocritical and dangerous. First, if the
jury actually applies comparative negligence ideas and if we are
willing for them to do this, why not frankly tell them to do it, explain
how to do it, and see that they do it correctly? Second, why en-
courage the jury, as a part of the court system, to disregard the law
announced to them and to apply their own ideas of what they think
the law ought to be? In these days of disrespect for the law and of
a developing attitude that each individual may decide for himself
which laws he will obey, this position seems almost self-destructive-
a kind of death wish. If the jury has been applying the moral concepts
of the community, the law should be in accord with those concepts.
Let the stated law be in accordance with the law in practice. Let us
be frank about what is being done.
As for the first argument (court control of jury), it can be effec-
tive only when a directed verdict is given for the defendant.27 There
is no control of the jury once it receives the case. Under a compara-
tive negligence system, on the other hand, a court may continue to
exercise a real measure of control over the jury, even after the jury
has received the case. This can be accomplished by means of in-
structions telling the jury how to do what it is already inclined to
do, and by a provision for a single special verdict, which will help
the jury to be sure to do as it is told and permit the court to ascertain
if the jury acted in accordance with instructions.28
Thus, in an over-simplified form, speaking in terms of legal con-
clusions, the jury might be told:
(1) If you find that the defendant was not negligent or that
his negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury,
you will find for the defendant.
Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938); Bell, J., in Karcesky v. Lana,
382 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955); ULMrAN, A JUDcE TAKEs THE STAND 30-34
(1933).
27. The argument does have some merit. The strong likelihood of incurring a directed
verdict may prevent the bringing of a case to trial when it has no inherent merit and is
being brought only for its nuisance value. But the injustice of the contributory negli-
gence rule far outweighs this. And directed verdicts still could be granted on tho
ground either that the defendant was not negligent, or that the plaintiff's negligence
was the sole proximate cause of his injury.
28. It is not intended to suggest that any state adopt an intricate and complex special-
verdict system like that of Texas, or like that of Wisconsin, which has needlessly com-
plicated application of its principle of comparative negligence.
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(2) If you find that the defendant's negligence was a proximate
cause of the injury, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of negli-
gence which proximately contributed to his injury, you will render
a verdict for the plaintiff in the full amount of his damages.
(3) If you find that both parties were guilty of negligence which
proximately contributed to the injury, then you will answer these
two questions:
(i) What is the total amount of the damages suffered by the
plaintiff?
(ii) What percentage of these damages should be borne by
each party, taking into consideration the relative amount of fault
of each and the degree to which his conduct contributed to the
injUiy? 29
Modifications of these instructions to take care of the situation
where there is a cross-complaint or where there are more than two
parties can be made without difficulty.
It is sometimes argued that a jury is incapable of figuring out the
proportionate reduction of damages on a rational basis, since the test
is so indefinite. There are several answers to this. In the states
adopting comparative negligence as a general rule, there has been
no trouble; besides, almost every state now has some form of com-
parative negligence under a limited statute. If it is true that juries
frequently apply comparative negligence despite a contributory negli-
gence instruction, they ought to be able to perform better with an
instruction explicitly providing for comparative negligence. In any
event, damages in most tort cases are based on jury approximations
without specific tests. How does one tell the monetary value of the
pain and suffering involved in a broken leg? If the jury can deter-
mine this, it is also fully capable of apportioning the damages.
A final remark in this section. The reiterated argument that adop-
tion of a comparative negligence doctrine sounds the death knell of
the American jury system is sheer nonsense and probably only a smoke
screen. Both those who fear the loss of the jury system in negligence
cases and those who fear the loss of the fault concept to a system of
29. Obviously, I have made two assumptions in phrasing this last question: (1) that
the Mississippi and FELA rule (allowing plaintiff to recover even though his negligence
is greater than that of the defendant) should apply rather than the Arkansas and
Wisconsin rule (confining recovery to the case when plaintiff's negligence is less than
defendants); and (2) that the proportionate reduction should depend on both the
relative degrees of fault and the relative directness of causal relation. I believe both
of these positions are preferable and would elaborate if this were an article rather than
a comment; but either or both could be easily changed by a slight alteration of the
language of the question. On the first item, see Legis., Tort-Comparative Negligence
Statute, 18 Vm. L. REv. 327, 332-34 (1964); and on the second item see Cushman
v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 850 (Me. 1968).
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automatic awards in traffic accidents would be well-advised to seek to
perfect the systems they wish to defend, and comparative negligence
is a big step in that direction.
III. OBJECTIVE PBECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DECIDING AGENCY
The majority opinion in Maki gave no consideration to the merits of
the question whether contributory negligence should completely bar
a plaintiffs recovery or not. It simply held that the determination on
that matter was more appropriate for the legislature to make. From
the majority opinion, the legislature could obtain no indication as to
whether the court thought the present rule should be continued or
changed. If there is any indication, it is that the legislature should use
its own judgment, with the court being indifferent to the result.
Now the legislature is subjected to many pressures; and with the
powerful lobby mounted by liability insurance companies and by
attorneys having a personal interest in the outcome, there is little
reason to anticipate that legislative action is imminent in IlUinois. 30
Might the supreme court have given some consideration to the merits
(as the appellate court did-at the specific direction of the supreme
court) and then have indicated to the legislature its conclusions as
to whether a change is desirable or not? Would this have been effec-
tive? Certainly as a disinterested expression by distinguished author-
ities, it ought to bear much more weight than the arguments of paid
lobbyists who were presenting the viewpoints of self-interest groups;
and perhaps it would have proved persuasive.31
30. "The plaintiff-appellant declares, without contradiction being offered, that since
1937 there have been nine attempts in our legislature to change our contributory negli-
gence rule and that with a single exception none reached the floor of either House.
The prospect of securing through legislation a rule better styled to achieve fair disposi-
tions in negligence cases does not appear to be bright." Ward, J., dissenting, in
Maid v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 450 (Ill. 1968).
31. The strong strictures of the chief justice of Florida against the contributory
negligence rule in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Yniesta, 21 Fla. 700, 737-38 (1886), produced
legislative action at the next session. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.06 (1964); Maloney,
From Contributory Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135, 157
(1958). Unfortunately, the appeal of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Haeg v.
Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261 (1938), has had no effect on
the legislature over the ensuing 30 years. The Minnesota court has continued to
"believe the proper course is to suggest ... that the legislature can order the need
and propriety of any change of the rule." Havanetz v. Anderson, 276 Minn. 543, 545,
148 N.W.2d 564, 566 (1967) (family immunity in torts). It was expressly influenced
by the success of its action in the governmental tort immunity case of Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 18 N.W.2d 795 (1962), where it proposed
to change the law prospectively, beginning after the adjournment of the next session
of the legislature, and the legislature then acted to enact statutory provisions, MINN.
STAT. ANx. cl. 466 (1963). For discussion, see Peck, supra note 18, at 287, where
the interplay of the court and legislature in other states on the issue of governmental
immunity is described. What would have happened if the illinois Supreme Court in
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Since Judge Cardozo's paper in 1921 on A Ministry of Justice,32
there have been numerous presentations of the idea that there should
be some agency devoted to the full-time study of needed reforms in
the substantive or procedural law and which would draft and recom-
mend to the legislature statutes which it ought to be ready to accept.
Judge Henry Friendly expresses the idea charmingly in the title to his
recent paper, The Gap in Lawmaking-judges Who Cant and Legisla-
tors Who Wor't.3 Need the gap be quite as great, however? Must
the judiciary and the legislature be completely separate? Would not
some actual cooperation be possible? Why should not the bench-
especially the supreme court-make recommendations to the legisla-
ture-recommendations which should be treated with respect and due
consideration? 34 In the area of law reform, perhaps we have carried
entirely too far the traditional separation of the judiciary from the
legislature.
The suggestion that an objective recommendation from the court
ought to carry significant influence with the legislature gives rise to a
question about similar influence upon the court itself. After Maki v.
Frelk was decided by the appellate court, The Vanderbilt Law
Review felt that it was such an important decision that it deserved
a collection of comments, such as those published here. After ar-
rangements were made and two preliminary comments had been
submitted, the decision was reached that since the case was then
pending before the supreme court, none of the comments should be
published or, indeed, shown to anyone but the other commentators
until after the supreme court had made a final ruling. The feeling
was that there should be no action which could be construed as
Maki had announced that it would change the contributory negligence rule if the
legislature did not take action during its next session? The Illinois experience in the
tort immunity cases suggests the possibility that the legislature might have reacted
against this as being improper pressure.
32. 35 H v. L. REV. 113 (1921).
33. 63 COLUmM. L. IEv. 787 (1963).
34. There are some reasons why this should be particularly applicable to Illinois.
For over 130 years, the current Illinois Constitution carried a provision reading: "All
judges of courts of record, inferior to the supreme court, shall, on or before the first
day of June, of each year, report in writing to the judges of the supreme court such
defects and omissions in the laws as their experience may suggest; and the judges of
the supreme court shall . . . report in writing to the governor such defects in [sic]
omissions in the constitution and laws as they may find to exist, together with appropri-
ate forms of bills to cure such defects and omissions in the laws . . ." ILL. CoNsT. art.
VI, § 31 (1870). In 1962 the judicial article of the constitution was completely revised,
and the present provision provides for "an annual judicial conference to consider the
business of the several courts and to suggest improvements in the administration of
justice, and . . . report thereon in writing to the General Assembly not later than
January 31 in each legislative year." ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19 (1962). The Judicial




improperly seeking to influence the court. So, the supreme court
did not have the benefit of comments by six torts teachers who have,
over many years, given careful consideration to the problems in-
volved.
What else happened? There were three briefs filed by organiza-
tions as amici curiae. Two of these were frankly partisan, one be-
coming almost intemperate; both made one-sided presentations.3 The
parties involved in the organizations submitting these briefs were
vitally interested, financially and otherwise, in the outcome of the
case, and the briefs sought directly and forcefully to influence that
result.
This is not intended to be critical, either of the organizations in-
volved, or of the supreme court. It is intended as a suggestion that
consideration should be given to the question of whether our system
can be improved. It seems an ironic paradox when objective com-
mentators, who have no personal interest involved, feel constrained
by the punctiliousness of the present tradition to keep quiet, while
those who frankly seek to influence the court to adopt a result which
will favor their own interests are acting in full accordance with estab-
lished tradition when they file a brief. How to change the system?
I am not sure. Court rules for the filing of a brief amicus curiae are
such that only a strongly interested person or organization can spend
the time and money involved. Yet merely allowing a letter to be sent
might swamp the court, would certainly involve wearying duplication
of ideas, and, besides other objections, could be seriously abused.
Publication of arguments in a legal periodical while a case is still pend-
ing also has objections, which can easily be perceived, and it, too,
might be subject to serious abuse. The judges of our appellate courts
are seriously overburdened now and should not be subjected to a mass
of additional materials to peruse. But is it too much to suggest that
a way be devised to permit them openly to seek objective advice
from experts who have studied and thought in the field?
35. The third dealt primarily, not with the main issue, but with what kind of corm-
parative negligence the court should adopt if it decided to accept the principle.
[ VOL. 2,1
